Linear Quadratic Gaussian Mean-Field Controls of Social Optima by Qiu, Zhenghong et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
06
79
2v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  1
4 M
ay
 20
20
Manuscript submitted to doi:10.3934/xx.xx.xx.xx
AIMS’ Journals
Volume X, Number 0X, XX 200X pp. X–XX
LINEAR-QUADRATIC-GAUSSIAN MEAN-FIELD CONTROLS OF
SOCIAL OPTIMA
Zhenghong Qiu, Jianhui Huang and Tinghan Xie∗
Department of Applied Mathematics
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, China
(Communicated by the associate editor name)
Abstract. This paper investigates a class of unified stochastic linear qua-
dratic Gaussian (LQG) social optima problems involving a large number of
weakly-coupled interactive agents under a generalized setting. For each in-
dividual agent, the control and state process enters both diffusion and drift
terms in its linear dynamics, and the control weight might be indefinite in
cost functional. This setup is innovative and has great theoretical and re-
alistic significance as its applications in mathematical finance (e.g., portfolio
selection in mean-variation model). Using some fully-coupled variational anal-
ysis under person-by-person optimality principle, and mean-field approxima-
tion method, the decentralized social control is derived by a class of new type
consistency condition (CC) system for typical representative agent. Such CC
system is some mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equation
(MF-FBSDE) combined with embedding representation. The well-posedness
of such forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) system is
carefully examined. The related social asymptotic optimality is related to the
convergence of the average of a series of weakly-coupled backward stochastic
differential equation (BSDE). They are verified through some Lyapunov equa-
tions.
1. Introduction. Suppose that (Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P) is a complete filtered proba-
bility space, and W (·)={W1(·), · · · , WN (·)} is a N × 1-dimensional standard Brow-
nian motion defined on it. {Ft}t≥0 is the natural filtration generated by W (·)
augmented by all P-null sets in F . In this paper, we consider a weakly-coupled
large-population system with N agents, denoted by {Ai}1≤i≤N . The state process
of the ith agent Ai is modeled by the following controlled linear stochastic differen-
tial equation (SDE) on finite time horizon [0, T ]:
dxi(t) = (A(t)xi(t) +B(t)ui(t) + F (t)x
(N)(t))dt
+ (C(t)xi(t) +D(t)ui(t) + F˜ (t)x
(N)(t))dWi(t),
xi(0) = ξ0.
(1)
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where x(N)(t) , 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(t) denotes the state-average. A(·), B(·), F (·), C(·), D(·),
F˜ (·) are deterministic matrix-valued functions with appropriate dimensions. In
addition, to evaluate the performance of our control, we also introduce the following
individual cost functional for Ai:
Ji(u(·), ξ0) =1
2
E
{∫ T
0
‖xi(t)− Γ(t)x(N)(t)− η(t)‖2Q(t) + ‖ui(t)‖2R(t)dt
+ ‖xi(T )− Γ¯x(N)(T )− η¯‖2G
}
,
(2)
where u(·) = (u1(t), · · · , uN (t)) ∈ Uc and Q(·), R(·) and G(·) are weight matrices.
All agents work cooperatively and aim to minimize the social cost functional, which
is denoted as follows:
J (N)soc (u(·)) =
N∑
i=1
Ji(u(·)). (3)
In what follows, for sake of notation simplicity, we may suppress the time subscript
t if necessary.
The above setup (1), (2) and (3) has the following features in its structure.
• (1) All agents are highly interactive and coupled in their dynamics and cost
functionals due to the presence of state-average x(N). In particular, the in-
dividual cost functional depends on u = {u1, u2, · · · , un}, the control profile
of all agents owning to such weak-coupling. Thus, all agents frame a large-
population system with mean-field type. Such system arises from various fields
[3], [5], [9], [17], [18], [22]. Because of such mean-field structure, the related
dynamic optimization is subject to the curse of dimensionality and complexity
in numerical computation. Consequently, decentralized control which is based
on the local information set will be used instead of centralized control which
is based on the full information set. Note that the decentralized control for
multi-agent system is well documented in literature (see [1], [15], [19] [32]).
• (2) Unlike the noncooperative game in [14], [23], [24], where agents try to
minimize their own individual cost functional, all agents in our model aim to
minimize the social cost functional which is the summation of the cost func-
tionals of all agents. The relevant analysis is also very different: all agents
aim to reach the same criteria in Pareto or social optimality. They are seeking
some social optimal points instead the Nash equilibrium. Also, in the presence
of weakly-coupled interactive agents, some variational analysis should be ap-
plied to the person-by-person optimality to obtain some necessary condition
for such Pareto optimality criteria. Note that the social optima is also well
studied in literature, readers can refer to [2], [7], [8],[10], [20], [27].
• By (1) and (2), our work should be framed within the mean-field social op-
tima with numerous cooperative agents. Note that such problem has drawn
increasing research attentions in recent years, such as [16], [30] for LQG social
optima with constant noise, [33] for related analysis in Markov LQG setup,
[13] for related analysis in economic social welfare problem and [30] for robust
LQG social optima with drift uncertainty.
Note that in above state equation a generalized setting is considered. The state
process xi(·), control process ui(·) and state-average x(N) enter the diffusion term
when C,D, F˜ 6= 0, while in the recent research of mean-field social optima (see [15],
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[30], [31]), only constant volatility situation is studied. In particular, when D 6= 0,
the diffusion term is dependent on the control directly and the related stochastic
LQG problem can be referred asmultiplicative-noise control problem. The inclusion
of control variable in diffusion is well motivated by various real applications. One
such example comes from the well-known mean-variance portfolio problem ([6], [21],
[34], [38]) where the control process (risky portfolio allocation) naturally enters the
dynamics for given wealth process. There are rich literature for the discussion of
related LQG problem, readers can refer [28], [29], [35], [36], [37].
Our control-dependent setup is different from [12], [14], [15], [16], [30] in which
D = 0 and only drift is directly control-dependent. Such problem can be referred
as additive-noise LQG control problem, and has already been well investigated (see
[14], [15], [22], [33]). In principle, additive-noise problem has no essential distinction
to deterministic or constant volatility LQG (see [14], [16], [30]). Actually, with the
help of constant variation method and separable property for linear system, the
state can be represented by linear functional on state and control separately.
Besides, the weight matrices in cost functional are indefinite in our paper. Re-
cently, the LQG frameworks with indefinite weight matrices have been studied ex-
tensively in [28] and [29]. This setting has some interesting applications in math-
ematical finance (see [37], [38]). However, in some recent literatures of team op-
timization (e.g., [16], [30], [31]), only positive semi-definite weight is considered.
Consequently, our paper might be the first time to formulate a team problem under
such generalized setting with realistic significance. In addition, such extension also
brings some practical difficulties in our research.
Compared with pervious works, the difficulties appear in our research are as
follows:
1. In contrast with the conditions in [12], [16], [23], [30], the weight coefficients
in our model can be indefinite, and the convexity of the social cost functional
need to be discussed. Unlike game problems, where each agent only aims to
minimize its own low-dimensional personal cost functional, our team problem
is a high-dimensional control problem essentially. Hence, it is very difficult to
verify its convexity directly due to the dimensionality. However, the convexity
is crucial to the problem solvability (see [28]). In this paper, we bring some
low-dimensional criteria for the convexity of the social cost functional by using
some algebraic techniques.
2. In the general frameworks of mean-field games (see [3], [4], [11]), usually
the auxiliary control problem can be obtained directly by freezing the state-
average as some deterministic term. However, in the framework of social prob-
lem, this scheme will bring some ineffective strategy, which can not achieve the
asymptotic optimality. Thus, variational techniques are applied to distinguish
the high-order infinitesimals after the mean-filed approximation. In particu-
lar, N + 1 additional adjoint processes should be introduced to deal with the
cross-terms in the cost functional variation and a new type of auxiliary control
problem would be derived.
3. Our consistency condition (CC) system here is a highly coupled mean-field
forward-backward stochastic differential equation (MF-FBSDEs) system, in-
stead of an ordinary differential equations (ODEs) system in some other gen-
eral cases. Due to C, F˜ 6= 0, the adapted term enters the drift term of the
CC system. Thus, the dynamics of the mean-field terms cannot be obtained
by taking expectation. It is complicated to investigate its solvability directly
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by decoupling method. Thus, by applying decentralizing method, we trans-
form it to a linear forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE)
system, and study the well-posedness of the new system.
4. Unlike some previous works in [16], [30], [33], we use linear operator method
and Fre´chet derivative to prove the asymptotic social optimality. Because of
C,F, F˜ 6= 0, the error estimates are very hard to be given directly, since some
of them are coupled without explicit expression. To overcome such difficulty,
we decouple them via Lyapunov equations and estimate them in proper order.
The main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows:
• We setup a class of LQG control problem where both the drift and diffusion
terms are dependent on state process, control process and state-average and
give an approach to obtain the social optimal solution.
• By discussing the weight coefficients, some low-dimensional criteria for the
convexity of the social cost functional, which is a high-dimensional system,
are obtained.
• A highly coupled CC system (MF-FBSDE) is transformed to a equivalent
FBSDE by decentralizing transformation. The existence and uniqueness of
the CC system solution is characterized by a Riccati equation.
• By using the perturbation method to analyse the Fre´chet derivative of cost
functional, the decentralized mean-field controls we derived are proved to be
asymptotically optimal. To prove its asymptotical optimality, we apply some
classical estimates of SDEs, and investigate the optimality loss.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we formulates the social opti-
mal LQG control problem. In Section 3, the convexity of social cost functional is
discussed. We construct an auxiliary optimal control problem based on person-by-
person optimality and design the decentralized control in Section 4 and Section 5
respectively. In Section 6, some prior lemmas are given, and based on them the as-
ymptotic social optimality is proved. A numerical example is provided to simulate
the efficiency of decentralized control in Section 7. Section 8 is the conclusion of
this paper.
2. Problem Formulation. Before formulating the problem, we set a convention
about notation.
Notation: Throughout this paper, Rn×m and Sn denote the set of all (n×m) real
matrices and the set of all (n×n) symmetric matrices, respectively. We denote ‖ · ‖
as the standard Euclidean norm and 〈·, ·〉 as the standard Euclidean inner product.
For a vector x and a symmetric matrix S, ‖x‖2S = 〈Sx, x〉 = xTSx, where xT is
the transpose of x. For a matrix M , the norm ‖M‖ =
√
Tr(MTM), and the max-
norm, which is equivalent to the maximum absolute value of all elements, is denoted
by ‖M‖max. M > 0 (≥ 0) means that M is positive (semi-positive) definite and
M ≫ 0 means that, M − εI ≥ 0, for some ε > 0. λmax(M) denotes the maximum
eigenvalue of matrix M , while λmin(M) denotes the minimum eigenvalue of matrix
M . Let σ-algebra F it = σ(Wi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t) for 0 ≤ i ≤ N , Ft = σ(Wi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤
t, 1 ≤ i ≤ N), Fi = {F it}0≤t≤T , 0 ≤ i ≤ N is the natural filtration generated by
Wi(·). Correspondingly, we denote filtration F = {Ft}0≤t≤T . Next, for Euclidean
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space H, we introduce the following space:
L∞(0, T ;H) =
{
ϕ : [0, T ]→ H
∣∣ ϕ(·) is bounded and measurable},
L2
F
(Ω;H) =
{
ξ : Ω→ H
∣∣ ξ is F-measurable, E‖ξ‖2 <∞},
L2
F
(0, T ;H) =
{
x : [0, T ]× Ω→ H
∣∣ x(·) is F-progressively measurable,
‖x(t)‖2L2 , E
∫ T
0
‖x(t)‖2dt <∞},
L2
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];H)) =
{
x : [0, T ]× Ω→ H
∣∣ x(·) is F-progressively measurable,
continuous, E sup
t∈[0,T ]
‖x(t)‖2 <∞}.
Further, base on the information structure, two types of admissible control sets
are defined as follows. The centralized admissible control set is given by
Uc =
{
(u0, u1, · · · , uN)|ui(t) ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rm), 0 ≤ i ≤ N
}
.
Correspondingly, the decentralized admissible control set for Ai is given by
Ui =
{
ui|ui(t) ∈ L2Fi(0, T ;Rm)
}
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Now, we introduce the following two assumptions
1. (A1) The coefficients of the state equation satisfy the following:
A,C, F, F˜ ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×n), B,D ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×m).
2. (A2) The weighting coefficients in the cost functional satisfy the following:{
Q ∈ L∞(0, T ; Sn), Γ ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×n), R ∈ L∞(0, T ; Sm), η ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn),
Γ¯ ∈ Rn×n, G ∈ Sn, η¯ ∈ Rn.
Under (A1), for any given (u1, · · · , uN ) ∈ Uc, (1) admits a unique solution
(x1, · · · , xN ). Under (A2), the cost functional (2) is well-posed. We aim to work
out the optimal control for each agent to minimize the social cost functional. Thus
we propose the following social optimal problem:
Problem 1. Minimize J (N)soc (u) over {u = (u1, · · · , uN)|ui ∈ Uc}.
However, in the practical application, usually, the agent can only access its own
information (i.e., σ{F it ∪ σ(xi(s), s ≤ t)}) and the information of the others may
be unavailable for it. For this reason, we try to work out a so-called decentralized
control, which only depends on the agent’s own information, and we propose another
problem.
Problem 2. Minimize J (N)soc (u) over {u = (u1, · · · , uN)|ui ∈ Ui}.
3. Convexity. In this section, the convexity of the social cost functional will be
studied. The weight coefficients Q, R and G profoundly influence the convexity
of the cost functional. We start with positive semi-definite weight case, which
is relatively simple, and then further consider indefinite weight case. Indefinite
weight setting has some interesting mathematical finance background (see [37], [38]).
Before that, the state dynamics and the social cost functional could be rewritten in
a high-dimensional form.
dx = (Ax+Bu)dt+
N∑
i=1
(Cix+Diu)dWi, x(0) = Ξ. (4)
6 ZHENGHONG QIU, JIANHUI HUANG AND TINGHAN XIE
J (N)soc (u, ξ0) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
{
xTQx+ 2ST1 x+Nη
TQη + uTRudt
+ x(T )TGx(T ) + 2ST2 x(T ) +Nη¯
TGη¯
}
,
(5)
where
A =

A+ F
N
F
N
··· F
N
F
N
A+ F
N
··· F
N
...
...
. . .
...
F
N
F
N
··· A+ F
N

(Nn×Nn)
,B =
B 0 ··· 00 B ··· 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 ··· B

(Nn×Nm)
, Ξ =
(
ξ0
...
ξ0
)
(Nn×1)
, x =
(
x1
...
xN
)
(Nn×1)
,
Ci =
1
...
ith
...
N

0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
F˜
N
··· F˜
N
F˜
N
+C F˜
N
··· F˜
N
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0

(Nn×Nn)
, Di =
1
...
ith
...
N

0 ··· 0 ··· 0
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 ··· D ··· 0
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 ··· 0 ··· 0

(Nn×Nm)
, u =
(
u1
...
uN
)
(Nm×1)
,
(6)
and
Q =

Q+ 1
N
(ΓTQΓ−QΓ−ΓTQ) 1
N
(ΓTQΓ−QΓ−ΓTQ) ··· 1
N
(ΓTQΓ−QΓ−ΓTQ)
1
N
(ΓTQΓ−QΓ−ΓTQ) Q+ 1
N
(ΓTQΓ−QΓ−ΓTQ) ··· 1
N
(ΓTQΓ−QΓ−ΓTQ)
...
...
. . .
...
1
N
(ΓTQΓ−QΓ−ΓTQ) 1
N
(ΓTQΓ−QΓ−ΓTQ) ··· Q+ 1
N
(ΓTQΓ−QΓ−ΓTQ)

(Nn×Nn)
=
Q 0 ··· 00 Q ··· 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 ··· Q
+ 1
N
 Qˆ ··· Qˆ... . . . ...
Qˆ ··· Qˆ
− 1
N
(
Q ··· Q
...
. . .
...
Q ··· Q
)
,
G =
G 0 ··· 00 G ··· 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 ··· G
+ 1
N
(
Gˆ ··· Gˆ
...
. . .
...
Gˆ ··· Gˆ
)
− 1
N
(
G ··· G
...
. . .
...
G ··· G
)
,S1 = −
 ΓTQη−Qη...
ΓTQη−Qη

(Nn×1)
,S2 = −
 Γ¯TGη¯−Gη¯...
Γ¯TGη¯−Gη¯

(Nn×1)
,R =
R 0 ··· 00 R ··· 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 ··· R

(Nn×Nn)
,
(7)
where Qˆ , (Γ− I)TQ(Γ− I), Gˆ , (Γ¯− I)TG(Γ¯− I).
Through (4) and (5), we know that Problem 1 is actually a nN -dimensional
standard control problem. Using the method in [28], the solvability of Problem
1 and the optimal control can be derived. However, the population N is usually
large in realistic application, which would bring great computational complexity.
Thus, in what follows, some low-dimensional criteria for the convexity of the cost
functional will be studied.
3.1. Case 1: For Q, R, G are positive semi-definite. We start with the
simplest case that the weighting coefficients are all positive semi-definite. For the
convexity of the cost functional, it follows that
Proposition 3.1. Under (A1)-(A2) and Q,R,G ≥ 0, J (N)soc (u, ξ0) is convex w.r.t
(with respect to) u. Moreover, if R≫ 0, then J (N)soc (u, ξ0) is uniformly convex.
Proof. Under the assumption Q,R,G ≥ 0, we know
 Qˆ ··· Qˆ... . . . ...
Qˆ ··· Qˆ
 ≥ 0, ( Gˆ ··· Gˆ... . . . ...
Gˆ ··· Gˆ
)
≥
0 and R ≥ 0. By the definition of positive semi-definiteness, we can obtain the
following two inequalitiesQ 0 ··· 00 Q ··· 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 ··· Q
− 1
N
(
Q ··· Q
...
. . .
...
Q ··· Q
)
≥ 0,
G 0 ··· 00 G ··· 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 ··· G
− 1
N
(
G ··· G
...
. . .
...
G ··· G
)
≥ 0.
Further, the convexity would follow. Moreover, if R ≫ 0, then R ≫ 0 and
J (N)soc (u, ξ0) is uniformly convex.
Next, we consider a more general situation.
3.2. Case 2: For Q, R and G are all indefinite. In this case, there are two
situations need to be discussed: F = F˜ = 0 and F, F˜ 6= 0. Now, we consider the
first situation: F = F˜ = 0.
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3.2.1. For F = F˜ = 0. In this situation, the agent’s state will not be influenced by
others (see [16]). In this situation, the agents’ state dynamics are decoupled. For
the cost functional, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that Q − Qˆ ≥ 0 and G − Gˆ ≥ 0, then for any ∆Q,
∆G ∈ Sn such that ∆Q ≥ Q − Qˆ and ∆G ≥ G − Gˆ, we have Q − Q2 ≥ 0 and
G−G2 ≥ 0 where
Q2 =
Q−∆Q 0 ··· 00 Q−∆Q ··· 0... ... ... ...
0 0 ··· Q−∆Q
 , G2 =
G−∆G 0 ··· 00 G−∆G ··· 0... ... ... ...
0 0 ··· G−∆G
 .
Proof. Consider matrix Q2, G2, Q−Q2 and G−G2 which are
Q2 ,
Q−∆Q 0 ··· 00 Q−∆Q ··· 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 ··· Q−∆Q
 , Q−Q2 =

∆Q+ 1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q 1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q ··· 1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q
1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q ∆Q+ 1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q ··· 1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q
...
...
. . .
...
1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q 1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q ··· ∆Q+ 1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q
 ,
G2 ,
G−∆G 0 ··· 00 G−∆G ··· 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 ··· G−∆G
 , G−G2 =

∆G+ 1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G 1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G ··· 1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G
1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G ∆G+ 1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G ··· 1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G
...
...
. . .
...
1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G 1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G ··· ∆G+ 1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G
 .
If Q− Qˆ ≥ 0 holds, then for any non-zeros vector (xT1 , · · · , xTN )T ∈ RNn×1 and any
∆Q ≥ Q− Qˆ, x1x2...
xN
T

∆Q+ 1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q 1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q ··· 1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q
1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q ∆Q+ 1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q ··· 1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q
...
...
. . .
...
1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q 1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q ··· ∆Q+ 1
N
Qˆ− 1
N
Q

 x1x2...
xN

=(xT1∆Qx1 + · · ·+ xTN∆QxN ) +
1
N
(x1 + · · ·+ xN )T Qˆ(x1 + · · ·+ xN )
− 1
N
(x1 + · · ·+ xN )TQ(x1 + · · ·+ xN )
=(xT1∆Qx1 + · · ·+ xTN∆QxN )−
1
N
(x1 + · · ·+ xN )T (Q− Qˆ)(x1 + · · ·+ xN )
≥(xT1∆Qx1 + · · ·+ xTN∆QxN )− (xT1 (Q− Qˆ)x1 + · · ·+ xTN (Q − Qˆ)xN )
=xT1 (∆Q − (Q− Qˆ))x1 + · · ·+ xTN (∆Q − (Q− Qˆ))xN ≥ 0.
By the same argument, one can also obtain x1x2...
xN
T

∆G+ 1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G 1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G ··· 1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G
1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G ∆G+ 1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G ··· 1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G
...
...
. . .
...
1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G 1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G ··· ∆G+ 1
N
Gˆ− 1
N
G

 x1x2...
xN
 ≥ 0.
Thus, Q−Q2 ≥ 0 and G−G2 ≥ 0 and the proposition is proved.
Consequently, Proposition 3.2 implies
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
xTQx+ uTRudt+ x(T )TGx(T )
}
≥ 1
2
E
{∫ T
0
xTQ2x+ u
TRudt+ x(T )TG2x(T )
}
.
(8)
Motivated by (8), we have the following result:
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Proposition 3.3. Under (A1)-(A2), F = F˜ = 0, Q − Qˆ ≥ 0 and G − Gˆ ≥ 0,
if there exist some ∆Q, ∆G ∈ Sn such that ∆Q ≥ Q − Qˆ, ∆G ≥ G − Gˆ and the
following low-dimensional control problem min
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
xT (Q−∆Q)x+ uTRudt+ xT (T )(G−∆G)x(T )
}
,
s.t. dx = (Ax +Bu)dt+ (Cx +Du)dW, x(0) = 0.
(9)
is (uniformly) convex, then J (N)soc (u) is (uniformly) convex.
Proof. According to the result of [28], J (N)soc (u, ξ0) is (uniformly) convex if J˜ (N)soc (u, 0) ≥
0 (≥ εE ∫ T0 ‖u‖2dt for some constant ε) where
J˜ (N)soc (u, 0) ,
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
xTQx+ uTRudt+ x(T )TGx(T )
}
,
s.t. dx = (Ax+Bu)dt+
N∑
i=1
(Cix+Diu)dWi, x(0) = 0.
By (A1)-(A2) and (8), for any ∆Q ≥ Q− Qˆ and ∆G ≥ G− Gˆ, if 12E
{ ∫ T
0
xTQ2x+
uTRudt + x(T )TG2x(T )
} ≥ 0 (≥ εE ∫ T
0
‖u‖2dt) holds, then the (uniform) con-
vexity of J (N)soc (u, ξ0) would follow. Moreover, Q2 is diagonal block matrix and the
following problem is decouple.
min
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
xTQ2x+ u
TRudt+ x(T )TG2x(T )
}
,
s.t. dx = (Ax +Bu)dt+
N∑
i=1
(Cix+Diu)dWi, x(0) = 0.
(10)
Thus, the convexity of (10) is equivalent to the convexity of (9), and 12E
{ ∫ T
0 x
TQ2x+
uTRudt+x(T )TG2x(T )
} ≥ 0 (≥ εE ∫ T0 ‖u‖2dt) if (9) is (uniformly) convex. The-
orem 3.3 is proved.
Note that the convexity of a low-dimensional control problem has been well
studied in [28] and [29]. Thus, we will not further discuss the convexity of (9) here.
Next, the second situation: F, F˜ 6= 0 will be studied. In this situation, for
discussion simplicity, we also assume that G ≥ 0.
3.2.2. For G ≥ 0, F, F˜ 6= 0. In this situation, the state of each agents will be
influenced by the others (see [31] where F 6= 0 is assumed). It is inaccessible
to obtain a decoupled low-dimensional problem due to the coupling of the state
dynamics. To analyse J˜ (N)soc (u, 0), we firstly estimate the L2 norm of x which is
given by (10). Applying Itoˆ’s formula to x and taking expectation, one can obtain
E‖x(t)‖2 = E
∫ t
0
[
xT
(
A+AT +
N∑
i=1
CTi Ci
)
x+ xT
(
2B+ 2
N∑
i=1
CTi Di
)
u+ uT
N∑
i=1
DTi Diu
]
ds,
(11)
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where
N∑
i=1
CTi Ci =
CTC 0 ··· 00 CTC ··· 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 ··· CTC
+ 1
N
 (F˜+C)T (F˜+C) ··· (F˜+C)T (F˜+C)... . . . ...
(F˜+C)T (F˜+C) ··· (F˜+C)T (F˜+C)
− 1
N
(
CTC ··· CTC
...
. . .
...
CTC ··· CTC
)
≥ 0,
AT +A =
A
T+A 0 ··· 0
0 AT+A ··· 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· AT+A
+ 1
N
(
FT+F ··· FT+F
...
. . .
...
FT+F ··· FT+F
)
≤
A
T+A 0 ··· 0
0 AT+A ··· 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· AT+A
+
 λmax(FT+F )I ··· 0... . . . ...
0 ··· λmax(FT+F )I
 ,
N∑
i=1
DTi Di =
DTD 0 ··· 00 DTD ··· 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 ··· DTD
 , N∑
i=1
CTi Di =
1
N
(
F˜TD ··· F˜TD
...
. . .
...
F˜TD ··· F˜TD
)
+
 CTD 0 ··· 00 CTD ··· 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 ··· CTD
 ,
N∑
i=1
DTi Ci
N∑
i=1
CTi Di =
1
N
(
DT F˜ ··· DT F˜
...
. . .
...
DT F˜ ··· DT F˜
)
1
N
(
F˜TD ··· F˜TD
...
. . .
...
F˜TD ··· F˜TD
)
+
DTC 0 ··· 00 DTC ··· 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 ··· DTC
 1
N
(
F˜TD ··· F˜TD
...
. . .
...
F˜TD ··· F˜TD
)
+
1
N
(
DT F˜ ··· DT F˜
...
. . .
...
DT F˜ ··· DT F˜
) CTD 0 ··· 00 CTD ··· 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 ··· CTD
+
DTC 0 ··· 00 DTC ··· 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 ··· DTC
CTD 0 ··· 00 CTD ··· 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 ··· CTD

=
DTCCTD 0 ··· 00 DTCCTD ··· 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 ··· DTCCTD
 + 1
N
DT (F˜ F˜T+CF˜T+F˜CT )D ··· DT (F˜ F˜T+CF˜T+F˜CT )D... . . . ...
DT (F˜ F˜T+CF˜T+F˜CT )D ··· DT (F˜ F˜T+CF˜T+F˜CT )D
 .
Moreover, to estimate x, we still need the following result:
Proposition 3.4. Suppose S is a real symmetric matrix, then for any real vector
x,
λmin(S)‖x‖2 ≤ xTSx ≤ λmax(S)‖x‖2.
Proof. S ∈ Sn is a real symmetric matrix. There exists an orthogonal matrix P
such that P−1SP = Λ, where Λ is diagonal and the diagonal elements are the
eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λn of S. Hence, by letting P
Tx = y = (yT1 , · · · , yTn )T , we have
xTSx = xTPΛPTx = λ1y
2
1 + · · ·+ λny2n.
This implies that λmin(S)‖y‖2 ≤ xTSx ≤ λmax(S)‖y‖2. Noting the orthogonality
of P , we have ‖y‖2 = xTPPTx = ‖x‖2 and the result of Proposition 3.4 follows.
Based on (11) and Proposition 3.4, the estimation of E‖x(t)‖2 and the convexity
of J (N)soc (u, ξ0) can be obtained as follows.
Proposition 3.5. Under (A1)-(A2), G ≥ 0, F, F˜ 6= 0 and Q−Qˆ ≥ 0, if there exist
some ∆Q ∈ Sn such that ∆Q ≥ Q − Qˆ, λmin(Q −∆Q) ≤ 0 and Ke2KTλmin(Q −
∆Q) + 12λmin(R) ≥ 0 (or ≥ εI for some ε > 0), then J
(N)
soc (u, ξ0) is convex (or
uniformly convex). K is given by
K = max
{(
λmax(A
T +A) + λmax(F
T + F )
)
, λmax
(
CTC + (F˜ + C)T (F˜ + C)
)
,
√
λmax(BTB),√
λmax
(
DT (F˜ F˜T + CF˜T + F˜CT )D
)
+ λmax
(
DTCCTD
)
, λmax(D
TD)
}
.
Moreover, if Q ≤ 0 is assumed, then condition λmin(Q−∆Q) ≤ 0 would follow.
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Proof. By Proposition 3.4 and noting that the non-zero eigenvalues of 1
N
(
A ··· A
...
...
...
A ··· A
)
,(
A 0
. . .
0 A
)
and A are the same, we have

xT
(
N∑
i=1
CTi Ci
)
x ≤ λmax
(
CTC + (F˜ + C)T (F˜ + C)
)
‖x‖2,
xT
(
AT +A
)
x ≤ [λmax(AT +A) + λmax(FT + F )]‖x‖2,
2xTBu = 〈Bu,x〉+ 〈u,BTx〉 ≤
√
〈Bu,Bu〉〈x,x〉 +
√
〈u,u〉〈BTx,BTx〉
≤ 2
√
λmax(BTB)‖u‖‖x‖,
2xT
N∑
i=1
CTi Diu ≤ 2
√√√√λmax( N∑
i=1
DTi Ci
N∑
i=1
CTi Di
)
‖u‖‖x‖
≤ 2
√
λmax
(
DT (F˜ F˜T + CF˜T + F˜CT )D
)
+ λmax
(
DTCCTD
)‖u‖‖x‖,
uT
N∑
i=1
DTi Diu ≤ λmax(DTD)‖u‖2.
Thus, the estimation below would follows
E‖x(t)‖2 = E
∫ t
0
[
xT
(
A+AT +
N∑
i=1
CTi Ci
)
x+ xT
(
2B+ 2
N∑
i=1
CTi Di
)
u+ uT
N∑
i=1
DTi Diu
]
ds
≤ KE
∫ t
0
[
‖x‖2 + 2‖u‖‖x‖+ ‖u‖2
]
ds ≤ 2K
∫ t
0
[
E‖x‖2 + E‖u‖2
]
ds,
where
K = max
{(
λmax(A
T +A) + λmax(F
T + F )
)
, λmax
(
CTC + (F˜ + C)T (F˜ + C)
)
,
√
λmax(BTB),√
λmax
(
DT (F˜ F˜T + CF˜T + F˜CT )D
)
+ λmax
(
DTCCTD
)
, λmax(D
TD)
}
≥ 0.
Further, by Gronwall’s inequality, E‖x(t)‖2 ≤ 2Ke2Kt‖u‖2L2. Noting that G ≥ 0
and λmin(Q−∆Q) ≤ 0, the estimation of J˜ (N)soc (u, 0) can be derived as
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
xTQx+ uTRudt+ x(T )TGx(T )
}
≥1
2
E
{∫ T
0
xTQ2x+ u
TRudt
}
≥ Ke2KTλmin(Q −∆Q)‖u‖2L2 +
1
2
λmin(R)‖u‖2L2 ,
and Proposition 3.5 can be obtained.
Moreover, if we further assume that Q ≤ 0, then Qˆ = (Γ − I)TQ(Γ − I) ≤ 0.
Thus, it follows that 0 ≥ Qˆ ≥ Q−∆Q and condition λmin(Q−∆Q) ≤ 0 will follow
as well.
Remark 3.6. x(t) is driven by u(t), and ‖x‖2
L2
can be bounded by the multiple
of ‖u‖2L2 via the Gronwall’s inequality. Thus, J˜ (N)soc (u, 0) can also be estimated by
‖u‖2
L2
. Though the conditions λmin(Q−∆Q) ≤ 0 (or Q ≤ 0) and Ke2KTλmin(Q−
∆Q)+ 12λmin(R) ≥ 0 in Proposition 3.5, we see that R ≥ 0 should hold to neutralize
the negative definiteness of Q. However, the opposite is not true. ‖u‖2L2 can not be
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bounded by ‖x‖2L2. Thus, if R ≤ 0, we can not estimate how “large” Q should be
to neutralize the negative definiteness of R.
Through the discussion above, we have studied the (uniform) convexity of the
social cost functional. For the sake of simplicity, we introduce the following uniform
convexity assumption.
3. (A3) J (N)soc (u) is uniformly convex w.r.t. u.
Under (A1)-(A3), J (N)soc (u) is uniformly convex, and consequently Problem 1,
2 are both uniquely solvable. In what follows, the problem will be discussed under
such assumption. Next, we will apply variational method to analyse the social
cost functional, and derive some decentralized controls based on person-by-person
optimality principle.
4. Person-by-person Optimality. Person-by-person optimality is a critical tech-
nique in mean-field social optima scheme, which has been applied in many recent
social optima literatures (e.g., [30], [31], [33]). It is very different from mean-field
games scheme, where the auxiliary control problem is usually derived directly by
fixing the state-average, and this would lead to some ineffective control in social op-
tima scheme. Thus, in this section, under the person-by-person optimality principle,
variation method will be used to analysis the mean-field approximation.
Consider the optimal centralized control u¯ = (u¯1, u¯2, · · · , u¯N) of the large pop-
ulation system. x¯ = (x¯1, x¯2, · · · , x¯N ) denotes the associated optimal state. We
perturb u¯i and keep u¯−i , (u¯1, · · · , u¯i−1, u¯i+1, · · · , u¯N) fixed. The perturbed con-
trol is denoted by u¯i + δui, while the associated perturbed state is denoted by
(x¯1 + δx1, · · · , x¯N + δxN ). The perturbation of the cost functional is denoted by
δJj , Jj(uj , u¯−i) − Jj(u¯j , u¯−i), for j = 1, · · · , N . Thus, the dynamic of Ai state
variation is
dδxi = (Aδxi +Bδui + Fδx
(N))dt+ (Cδxi +Dδui + F˜ δx
(N))dWi, δxi(0) = 0,
and the dynamics of the others’ variations are
dδxj = (Aδxj + Fδx
(N))dt+ (Cδxj + F˜ δx
(N))dWj , δxj(0) = 0. (12)
The summation of (12) yield that
dδx(−i) =
[
Aδx(−i) + F
N − 1
N
(δx(−i) + δxi)
]
dt+
∑
j 6=i
[
Cδxj +
F˜
N
(δx(−i) + δxi)
]
dWj ,
δx(−i)(0) = 0,
(13)
where δx(−i) ,
∑
j 6=i δxj . Further, by some elementary calculations, one can obtain
the variation of Ai cost functional
δJi =E
∫ T
0
〈Q(x¯i − Γx¯(N) − η), δxi − Γδx(N)〉+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉dt
+ E〈G(x¯i(T )− Γ¯x¯(N)(T )− η¯), δxi(T )− Γ¯δx(N)(T )〉,
(14)
and correspondingly, for j 6= i,
δJj =E
∫ T
0
〈Q(x¯j − Γx¯(N) − η), δxj − Γδx(N)〉dt
+ E〈G(x¯i(T )− Γ¯x¯(N)(T )− η¯), δxj(T )− Γ¯δx(N)(T )〉.
(15)
12 ZHENGHONG QIU, JIANHUI HUANG AND TINGHAN XIE
Hence, by combining (14) and (15), the variation of the social cost functional sat-
isfies
δJ (N)soc , δJi +
∑
j 6=i
δJj
=E
{∫ T
0
〈Q(x¯i − Γx¯(N) − η), δxi〉 − 〈ΓTQ(x¯i − Γx¯(N) − η), δx(N)〉+
∑
j 6=i
〈Q(x¯j − Γx¯(N) − η),
δxj〉 −
∑
j 6=i
〈ΓTQ(x¯j − Γx¯(N) − η), δx(N)〉+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉dt+ 〈G(x¯i(T )− Γ¯x¯(N)(T )− η¯),
δxi(T )〉 − 〈Γ¯TG(x¯i(T )− Γ¯x¯(N)(T )− η¯), δx(N)(T )〉+
∑
i6=j
〈G(x¯j(T )− Γ¯x¯(N)(T )− η¯), δxj(T )〉
−
∑
i6=j
〈Γ¯TG(x¯j(T )− Γ¯x¯(N)(T )− η¯), δx(N)(T )〉
}
.
We use mean-field term xˆ to replace x¯(N). Thus, we have
δJ (N)soc = E
{∫ T
0
〈Q(x¯i − Γxˆ− η), δxi〉+
∑
j 6=i
1
N
〈Q(x¯j − Γxˆ− η), Nδxj〉 − 〈 1
N
∑
j 6=i
ΓTQ(x¯j
− Γxˆ− η), δxi + δx(−i)〉+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉dt+ 〈G(x¯i(T )− Γ¯xˆ(T )− η¯), δxi(T )〉+
∑
i6=j
1
N
〈G(x¯j(T )
− Γ¯xˆ(T )− η¯), Nδxj(T )〉 −
∑
i6=j
1
N
〈Γ¯TG(x¯j(T )− Γ¯xˆ(T )− η¯), δxi(T ) + δx(−i)(T )〉+ ε1 + ε2
}
,
where

ε1 = E
{∫ T
0
〈(ΓTQΓ−QΓ)(x¯(N) − xˆ), Nδx(N)〉dt+ 〈(Γ¯TQΓ¯−QΓ¯)(x¯(N)(T )− xˆ(T )), Nδx(N)(T )〉
}
,
ε2 = E
{∫ T
0
−〈ΓTQ(x¯i − Γx¯(N) − η), δx(N)〉dt− 〈Γ¯TG(x¯i(T )− Γ¯xˆ(T )− η¯), δx(N)(T )〉
}
.
(16)
For the next step, we introduce limiting processes x∗∗ and x∗j satisfying
{
dx∗∗ = (Ax∗∗ + Fδxi + Fx∗∗)dt, x∗∗(0) = 0,
dx∗j = (Ax
∗
j + Fδxi + Fx
∗∗)dt+ (Cx∗j + F˜ δxi + F˜ x
∗∗)dWj , x∗j (0) = 0,
(17)
to substitute δx(−i) and Nδxj . This implies
δJ (N)soc = E
{∫ T
0
〈Q(x¯i − Γxˆ− η), δxi〉+ 1
N
∑
j 6=i
〈Q(x¯j − Γxˆ− η), x∗j 〉 − 〈ΓTQ((I − Γ)xˆ− η), δxi〉
− 〈ΓTQ(xˆ− Γxˆ− η), x∗∗〉+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉dt+ 〈G(x¯i(T )− Γ¯xˆ(T )− η¯), δxi(T )〉+ 1
N
∑
j 6=i
〈G(x¯j(T )
− Γ¯xˆ(T )− η¯), x∗j (T )〉 − 〈Γ¯TG((I − Γ¯)xˆ(T )− η¯), δxi(T )〉 − 〈Γ¯TG((I − Γ¯)xˆ(T )− η¯), x∗∗(T )〉+
4∑
i=1
εi
}
,
(18)
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where
ε3 = E
{∫ T
0
1
N
∑
j 6=i
〈Q(x¯j − Γxˆ− η), Nδxj − x∗j 〉 −
1
N
∑
j 6=i
〈ΓTQ(x¯j − Γxˆ− η), δx(−i) − x∗∗〉dt
+
1
N
∑
j 6=i
[〈G(x¯j(T )− Γ¯xˆ(T )− η¯), Nδxj(T )− x∗j (T )〉 − 〈Γ¯TG(x¯j(T )− Γ¯xˆ(T )− η¯), δx(−i)(T )− x∗∗(T )〉]
}
,
ε4 = E
{∫ T
0
−
〈
ΓTQ
(∑
j 6=i x¯j
N
− xˆ
)
,
N∑
i=1
δxi
〉
dt−
〈
Γ¯TG
(∑
j 6=i x¯j(T )
N
− xˆ(T )
)
,
N∑
i=1
δxi(T )
〉}
.
(19)
ε1-ε4 are actually o(1) order and the rigorous proof will show in Section 6.
Remark 4.1. Because of F, F˜ , C 6= 0, the limiting processes x∗∗ and x∗j driven by
(17) are stochastic, and such feature will bring many technical difficulties. Mainly,
when using dual method in the next step to substitute x∗∗ and x∗j , the processes
average will enter the drift term of the dual process. This makes the dual process
complicated and also bring difficulties in error estimation.
By contrast, in some previous social optima works, the limiting processes x∗∗, x∗j
are usually deterministic or even unnecessary. If F˜ = C = 0 (e.g., [30]), then the
dynamics of δx(−i) (13) and δxj (12) becomes
dδxj = (Aδxj +
F
N
δxi +
F
N
δx(−i))dt, δxj(0) = 0,
dδx(−i) =
[
Aδx(−i) + F
N − 1
N
(δx(−i) + δxi)
]
dt, δx(−i)(0) = 0.
Clearly, δxj and δx
(−i) are all deterministic and so are x∗∗, x∗j . Besides, if F = F˜ =
0 (e.g., [16]), then δx(−i) and δxj becomes
dδxj = Aδxjdt+ CδxjdWj , δxj(0) = 0,
dδx(−i) = Aδx(−i)dt+
∑
j 6=i
CδxjdWj , δx
(−i)(0) = 0.
By the homogeneity, δxj = δx
(−i) = 0 and no limiting approximation is needed.
Next, we will substitute x∗∗ and x∗j by dual method. It is very important to
construct an auxiliary control problem for investigating decentralized control in
socially optimal problem. An auxiliary control problem is usually a standard LQ
control problem (see [16], [30]). Since (18) contains x∗∗ and x∗j , we have to use a
duality procedure (see [37, Chapter 3]) to break away δJ (N)soc from the dependence
on x∗∗ and x∗j . To this end, we introduce the following two auxiliary equations
dy
j
1 = −[AT yj1 + CTβj1 +Q(x¯j − Γxˆ− η)]dt+ βj1dWj +
∑
j
′ 6=j
β
j′
1 dWj′ ,
dy2 = −[(A+ F )T y2 + FTEyj1 + F˜TEβj1 − ΓTQ(xˆ− Γxˆ− η)]dt,
y
j
1(T ) = G(x¯j(T )− Γ¯xˆ(T )− η¯), y2(T ) = −Γ¯TG((I − Γ¯)xˆ(T )− η¯).
(20)
By applying Itoˆ formula, we have the following duality relations
E〈G(x¯j(T )− Γ¯xˆ(T )− η¯), x∗j (T )〉 = E〈yj1(T ), x∗j (T )〉 − E〈yj1(0), x∗j (0)〉
=E
∫ T
0
〈−Q(x¯j − Γxˆ− η), x∗j 〉+ 〈F˜Tβj1 + FT yj1, x∗∗〉+ 〈F˜Tβj1 + FT yj1, δxi〉dt,
(21)
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and
E〈−Γ¯TG((I − Γ¯)xˆ(T )− η¯), x∗∗(T )〉 = E〈y2(T ), x∗∗(T )〉 − E〈y2(0), x∗∗(0)〉
=E
∫ T
0
〈ΓTQ(xˆ− Γxˆ− η)− FTEyj1 − F˜TEβj1 , x∗∗〉+ 〈FT y2, δxi〉dt.
(22)
Combining (18), (21) and (22),
δJ (N)soc = E
∫ T
0
〈Qx¯i, δxi〉+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉 − 〈Q(Γxˆ+ η) + ΓTQ((I − Γ)xˆ− η)− FT y2 − F˜TEβj1
− FTEyj1, δxi〉dt+ 〈Gx¯i(T ), δxi(T )〉 − 〈G(Γ¯xˆ(T ) + η¯) + Γ¯TG((I − Γ¯)xˆ(T )− η¯), δxi(T )〉+
5∑
i=1
εi,
(23)
where
ε5 = E
∫ T
0
〈
F˜T
(
Eβ
j
1 −
∑N
j 6=i β
j
1
N
)
+ FT
(
Ey
j
1 −
∑N
j 6=i y
j
1
N
)
, δxi
〉
dt. (24)
Remark 4.2. In the discussion above, we introduce N + 1 adjoint processes to
break away δJ (N)soc from the dependence on x∗∗ and x∗j . This difficulty is brought
by F, F˜ 6= 0. By contrast, if F = F˜ = 0 (e.g., [16]), then (23) becomes
δJ (N)soc = E
∫ T
0
〈Qx¯i, δxi〉+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉 − 〈Q(Γxˆ+ η) + ΓTQ((I − Γ)xˆ− η), δxi〉dt
+ 〈Gx¯i(T ), δxi(T )〉 − 〈G(Γ¯xˆ(T ) + η¯) + Γ¯TG((I − Γ¯)xˆ(T )− η¯), δxi(T )〉+ ε.
Clearly, no additional adjoint process is needed to derive the auxiliary problem.
Moreover, due to F, F˜ 6= 0, ε5 is the difference between the average and ex-
pectation of yj1, β
j
1. Generally, the dynamics of adapted terms β
j
1 is inaccessible.
To estimate it, some decoupling method is applied via two Lyapunov equations in
Section 6.
Therefore, by using mean-field term yˆ2, yˆ1, βˆ1 to replace y2, Ey
j
1, Eβ
j
1 respectively,
the variation of decentralized auxiliary cost functional δJi yield that
δJi = E
∫ T
0
〈Qα¯i, δαi〉+ 〈Rv¯i, δvi〉 − 〈Q(Γxˆ+ η) + ΓTQ[(I − Γ)xˆ− η]− FT yˆ2 − F˜T βˆ1
− FT yˆ1, δαi〉dt+ 〈Gα¯i(T ), δαi(T )〉 − 〈G(Γ¯xˆ(T ) + η¯) + Γ¯TG[(I − Γ¯)xˆ(T )− η¯], δαi(T )〉,
(25)
and
δJ (N)soc = δJi +
6∑
i=1
εi,
where
ε6 = E
∫ T
0
〈Q(x¯i − α¯i), δxi〉+〈Qα¯i, δxi − δαi〉+〈R(u¯i − v¯i), δui〉+〈Rv¯i, δui − δvi〉
+ 〈FT (y2 − yˆ2) + F˜T (Eβj1 − βˆ1) + FT (Eyj1 − yˆi), δxi〉+ 〈FT yˆ2 + F˜T βˆ1 + FT yˆ1 −QΓxˆ
−Qη − ΓTQ[(I − Γ)xˆ− η], δxi − δαi〉dt+ 〈G(x¯i(T )− α¯i(T )), δxi(T )〉+ 〈Gα¯i(T ),
δxi(T )− δαi(T )〉 − 〈G(Γ¯xˆ(T ) + η¯) + Γ¯TG[(I − Γ¯)xˆ(T )− η¯], δxi(T )− δαi(T )〉.
(26)
Similarly, ε5, ε6 are also o(1) order. Thus if δJi = 0, we have δJ (N)soc −→ 0.
5. Decentralized control design.
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5.1. Auxiliary problem. Motivated by equation (25), for achieving δJi = 0, we
introduce the following auxiliary control problem:
Problem 3. Minimize Ji(vi) over vi ∈ Ui, where Ji ,
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
‖αi‖2Q + ‖vi‖2R + 2〈q1, αi〉dt+ ‖αi(T )‖2G + 2〈q2, αi(T )〉
}
,
dαi = (Aαi +Bvi + F xˆ)dt+ (Cαi +Dvi + F˜ xˆ)dWi, αi(0) = ξ0,
and
q1 , −Q(Γxˆ+ η)− ΓTQ[(I − Γ)xˆ− η] + FT yˆ2 + FT yˆ1 + F˜T βˆ1,
q2 , −G(Γ¯xˆ(T ) + η¯)− Γ¯TG[(I − Γ¯)xˆ(T )− η¯].
This is a standard LQ control problem, where the mean-field terms xˆ, yˆ2, yˆ1, βˆ1
will be determined by the CC system in Section 5.2. By referring [37], we have the
following result.
Lemma 5.1. Under the (A1)-(A3), the following Riccati equation{
P˙ + PA+ATP + CTPC +Q− (PB + CTPD)(R+DTPD)−1(BTP +DTPC) = 0,
P (T ) = G.
(27)
admits a unique regular solution such that (R + DTPD) ≫ 0, and for any given
xˆ, yˆ2, yˆ1, βˆ1 ∈ L1(s, T ;Rn), the auxiliary control problem (Problem 3) admits a
unique feedback form optimal control v¯i = Θ1α¯i +Θ2, where
Θ1 , −(R+DTPD)−1(BTP +DTPC), Θ2 , −(R+DTPD)−1(BTϕ+DTPF˜ xˆ),
(28)
and P satisfies (27) while ϕ is the unique solution of
ϕ˙+ [AT − (PB + CTPD)(R +DTPD)−1BT ]ϕ
− [(PB + CTPD)(R+DTPD)−1DT − CT ]PF˜ xˆ+ PF xˆ+ q1 = 0,
ϕ(T ) = q2.
(29)
α¯i is the corresponding optimal auxiliary state satisfying{
dα¯i =
[
(A+BΘ1)α¯i +BΘ2 + F xˆ
]
dt+
[
(C +DΘ1)α¯i +DΘ2 + F˜ xˆ
]
dWi,
α¯i(0) = ξ0.
(30)
5.2. CC system. Apply the decentralized control law (28) to (1), and let x˜i be the
realized state. By the limiting approximation, the conditions Ex˜i = xˆ, Ey
j
1 = yˆ1,
Eβ
j
1 = βˆ1 should holds. Then, x˜i satisfies{
dx˜i = (Ax˜i +B(Θ1x˜i +Θ2) + F x˜
(N))dt+ (Cx˜i +D(Θ1x˜i +Θ2) + F˜ x˜
(N))dWi,
x˜i(0) = ξ0,
(31)
and
Θ1 = −(R+DTPD)−1(BTP +DTPC), Θ2 = −(R+DTPD)−1(BTϕ+DTPF˜Ex˜i).
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Here
ϕ˙+ [AT − (PB + CTPD)(R +DTPD)−1BT ]ϕ
− [(PB + CTPD)(R+DTPD)−1DT − CT ]PF˜Ex˜i + PFEx˜i
−Q(ΓEx˜i + η)− ΓTQ[(I − Γ)Ex˜i − η] + FT yˆ2 + FT yˆ1 + F˜T βˆ1 = 0,
ϕ(T ) = −G(Γ¯Ex˜i(T ) + η¯)− Γ¯TG[(I − Γ¯)Ex˜i(T )− η¯].
The auxiliary processes (20) becomes
dy
j
1 = −[AT yj1 + CTβj1 +Q(x˜j − ΓEx˜i − η)]dt+ βj1dWj +
∑
j
′ 6=j
β
j′
1 dWj′ ,
dy2 = −[(A+ F )T y2 + FTEyj1 + F˜TEβj1 − ΓTQ(Ex˜i − ΓEx˜i − η)]dt,
y
j
1(T ) = G(x˜j(T )− Γ¯Ex˜i(T )− η¯), y2(T ) = −Γ¯TG((I − Γ¯)Ex˜i(T )− η¯).
By taking summation and expectation of (31), we have
dx˜(N) = (Ax˜(N) +B(Θ1x˜
(N) +Θ2) + F x˜
(N))dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
(Cx˜i +D(Θ1x˜i +Θ2) + F˜ x˜
(N))dWi, x˜
(N)(0) = ξ0,
dEx˜i = (AEx˜i +B(Θ1Ex˜+Θ2) + FEx˜i)dt, Ex˜i(0) = ξ0.
On the other hand, by basic property of Itoˆ integral, for i 6= j, we have〈∫ t
0
(Cx˜i +D(Θ1x˜i +Θ2) + F˜ x˜
(N))dWi,
∫ t
0
(Cx˜j +D(Θ1x˜j +Θ2) + F˜ x˜
(N))dWj
〉
= 0.
Thus, it follows that
lim
N→+∞
E
∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
∫ t
0
(Cx˜i +D(Θ1x˜i +Θ2) + F˜ x˜
(N))dWi
∥∥∥∥2 = 0, in L2(0, T ;Rn).
This implies that x˜(N) → Ex˜i when N → ∞, and correspondingly we denotes
x˜i → xˇ, yj1 → yˇ1, y2 → yˇ2. By letting
Π1 = A−B(R +DTPD)−1(BTP +DTPC), Π2 = F −B(R+DTPD)−1DTPF˜ ,
Π3 = −B(R +DTPD)−1BT , Π′1 = C −D(R+DTPD)−1(BTP +DTPC),
Π4 = (PB + C
TPD)(R+DTPD)−1DTPF˜ − CTPF˜ + PF +QΓ + ΓTQ(I − Γ),
Π′2 = F˜ −D(R+DTPD)−1DTPF˜ , Π′3 = −D(R+DTPD)−1BT ,
(32)
we have the following CC system:
dxˇ = (Π1xˇ+Π2Exˇ+Π3ϕˇ)dt+ (Π
′
1xˇ+Π
′
2Exˇ+Π
′
3ϕˇ)dB(t),
dϕˇ = (−ΠT1 ϕˇ+Π4Exˇ− FT yˇ2 − FTEyˇ1 − F˜TEβˇ1 +Qη − ΓTQη)dt,
dyˇ1 = (−Qxˇ+QΓExˇ−AT yˇ1 − CT βˇ1 +Qη)dt+ βˇ1dB(t),
dyˇ2 = [Γ
TQ(I − Γ)Exˇ− FTEyˇ1 − F˜TEβˇ1 − (A+ F )T yˇ2 − ΓTQη]dt,
xˇ(0) = ξ0, ϕˇ(T ) = −G(Γ¯Exˇ(T ) + η¯)− Γ¯TG[(I − Γ¯)Exˇ(T )− η¯],
yˇ1(T ) = G(xˇ(T )− Γ¯Exˇ(T )− η¯), yˇ2(T ) = −Γ¯TG((I − Γ¯)Exˇ(T )− η¯),
(33)
where B(t) is a generic Brownian motion. Due to the symmetry and decentral-
ization, only one generic Brownian motion B(t) is needed to characterize the CC
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system here. Moreover, the mean-field terms xˆ, yˆ1, βˆ1 can be determined by xˆ = Exˇ,
yˆ1 = Eyˇ1, βˆ1 = Eβˇ1, yˆ2 = Eyˇ2 = yˇ2.
Remark 5.2. CC system (33) is a highly coupled MF-FBSDEs. It is different
from a general CC system (e.g., [4], [12], [14]), since the adapted terms (i.e., CT βˇ1,
F˜TEβˇ1) enter the drift term. In general situation, by taking expectation on the
realized state, an ODEs type CC system would be obtained. However, in our
system here, CT βˇ1, F˜
T
Eβˇ1 can not be determined. Thus, the dynamics of xˆ, yˆ1
and βˆ1 cannot be obtained directly, and we can only represent them in an embedded
way.
5.3. Solvability of CC system. In what follows, to simplify CC system (33),
we apply some decentralizing method, which is firstly proposed by Jiongmin Yong
in [36]. This method would bring us a “global solution”, while the traditional
contraction mapping (see [4], [11]) can only lead to a “local solution”. Here “global
solution” means the solution is admitted in the whole time duration [0, T ], and
“local solution” means the solution could only be admitted in a small time duration
[T0, T ].
To apply the decentralizing method, for the first step, we rewrite (33) as follows

dX =
(
A1X + A¯1EX +B1Y
)
dt+
(
A′1X + A¯
′
1EX +B
′
1Y
)
dB(t),
dY =
(
A2X + A¯2EX +B2Y + B¯2EY + C2Z + C¯2EZ + f
)
dt+ ZdB(t),
X(0) = ξ¯0, Y (T ) = G¯X(T ) + G¯
′
EX(T ) + g,
(34)
where
X ,
(
xˇ
0
0
)
, Y ,
(
ϕˇ
yˇ1
yˇ2
)
, Z ,
(
0
β1
0
)
, ξ¯0 ,
(
ξ0
0
0
)
,
A1 ,
(
Π1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
, A¯1 ,
(
Π2 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
, B1 ,
(
Π3 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
, A′1 ,
(
Π′
1
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
, A¯′1 ,
(
Π′
2
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
,
B′1 ,
(
Π′
3
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
, A2 ,
(
0 0 0
−Q 0 0
0 0 0
)
, A¯2 ,
(
Π4 0 0
QΓ 0 0
−ΓTQ(I−Γ) 0 0
)
,
B2 ,
(
−ΠT
1
0 FT
0 −AT 0
0 0 −(A+F )T
)
, B¯2 ,
(
0 −FT 0
0 0 0
0 −FT 0
)
, C2 ,
( 0 0 0
0 −CT 0
0 0 0
)
, C¯2 ,
(
0 −F˜T 0
0 0 0
0 −F˜T 0
)
,
f ,
(
Qη−ΓTQη
Qη
ΓTQη
)
, G¯ ,
(
0 0 0
G 0 0
0 0 0
)
, G¯′ ,
(
[−GΓ¯−Γ¯TG(I−Γ¯)] 0 0
−GΓ¯ 0 0
−Γ¯TG(I−Γ¯) 0 0
)
, g ,
(
Γ¯TGη¯−Gη¯
−Gη¯
Γ¯TGη¯
)
.
By taking expectation of (34), one can obtain the following decentralized functions

dEX =
[
(A1 + A¯1)EX +B1EY
]
dt, EX(0) = ξ¯0,
d(X − EX) = [A1(X − EX) +B1(Y − EY )] dt
+
[
A′1(X − EX) + (A′1 + A¯′1)EX +B′1(Y − EY ) +B′1EY
]
dB(t),
dEY =
[
(A2 + A¯2)EX + (B2 + B¯2)EY + (C2 + C¯2)EZ + f
]
dt,
d(Y − EY ) = [A2(X − EX) +B2(Y − EY ) + C2(Z − EZ)] dt+ ZdB(t),
(X − EX)(0) = 0, EY (T ) = (G¯+ G¯′)EX(T ) + g, Y (T )− EY (T ) = G¯(X − EX)(T ).
(35)
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Motivated by (35), we introduce the following FBSDEs
dX1 =
[
(A1 + A¯1)X1 +B1Y1
]
dt,
dX2 = [A1X2 +B1Y2] dt+
[
A′1X2 + (A
′
1 + A¯
′
1)X1 +B
′
1Y2 +B
′
1Y1
]
dB(t),
dY1 =
[
(A2 + A¯2)X1 + (B2 + B¯2)Y1 + (C2 + C¯2)EZ + f
]
dt,
dY2 = [A2X2 +B2Y2 + C2(Z − EZ)] dt+ ZdB(t),
X1(0) = ξ¯0, X2(0) = 0, Y1(T ) = (G¯+ G¯
′)X1(T ) + g, Y2(T ) = G¯X2(T ).
(36)
By comparing (34) and (36), we have the following result.
Proposition 5.3. If
det
(
(0, I)Φ(T, 0)
(
0
I
))
6= 0, (37)
where Φ is the transmission matrix w.r.t.
(
A1 B1
A2−G¯A1+(B2−G¯B1)G¯ B2−G¯B1
)
, then the
MF-FBSDEs system (34) is equivalent to the FBSDEs system (36).
Proof. Suppose that (X,Y, Z) is the adapted solution of system (34). LetX1 = EX ,
Y1 = EY , X2 = X − EX , Y2 = Y − EY , and it is easy to verify that X1, Y1, X2,
Y2 satisfy the system (36). Conversely, if (X1, Y1, X2, Y2) is the solutions of system
(36), then let X = X1 +X2, Y = Y1 + Y2, and we have
dX =
(
A1X + A¯1X1 +B1Y
)
dt+
(
A′1X + A¯
′
1X1 +B
′
1Y
)
dB(t),
dY =
(
A2X + A¯2X1 +B2Y + B¯2Y1 + C2Z + C¯2EZ + f
)
dt+ ZdB(t),
X(0) = ξ¯0, Y (T ) = G¯X(T ) + G¯
′X1(T ) + g.
Thus, we just need to verify thatX1 = E(X1+X2) and Y1 = E(Y1+Y2). Considering
the expectation of X2 and Y2, it follows that
dEX2 = [A1EX2 +B1EY2] dt,
d(EY2 − G¯EX2) =
[
(A2 − G¯A1 + (B2 − G¯B1)G¯)EX2 + (B2 − G¯B1)(EY2 − G¯EX2)
]
dt,
EX2(0) = 0, (EY2 − G¯EX2)(T ) = 0.
Clearly, if
det
(
(0, I)Φ(T, 0)
(
0
I
))
6= 0,
then EX2 = EY2 ≡ 0. Besides, X1 and Y1 are deterministic, which implies X1 =
E(X1 +X2) and Y1 = E(Y1 + Y2).
To study the solvability of (36), we firstly rewrite it as following form{
dX˜ = (A˜1X˜ + B˜1Y˜ )dt+ (A˜
′
1X˜ + B˜
′
1Y˜ )dB(t), X˜(0) = ξ˜0,
dY˜ = (A˜2X˜ + B˜2Y˜ + C˜2Z˜ +
˜¯C2EZ˜ + f˜)dt+ Z˜dB(t), Y˜ (T ) = G˜X˜ + g˜,
(38)
where X˜ =
(
X1
X2
)
, Y˜ =
(
Y1
Y2
)
, A˜1 =
(
A1+A¯1 0
0 A1
)
, B˜1 =
(
B1 0
0 B1
)
, A˜′1 =
(
0 0
A′
1
+A¯′
1
A′
1
)
,
B˜′1 =
(
0 0
B′
1
B′
1
)
, A˜2 =
(
A2+A¯2 0
0 A2
)
, B˜2 =
(
B2+B¯2 0
0 B2
)
, C˜2 =
(
0 0
0 C2
)
, ˜¯C2 =(
0 C2+C¯2
0 −C2
)
, G˜ =
(
G¯+G¯′ 0
0 G¯
)
, f˜ =
(
f
0
)
, ξ˜0 =
(
ξ¯0
0
)
, g˜ =
(
g
0
)
. Since (38) is a FB-
SDE, we use Riccati equation method to decouple it, and its solvability yield that:
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Lemma 5.4. Under the (A1)-(A2), if the following Riccati equation{
− K˙ + B˜2K + (C˜2 + ˜¯C2)KA˜′1 + (C˜2 + ˜¯C2)KB˜′1K −KA˜1 −KB˜1 + A˜2 = 0,
K(T ) = G˜,
(39)
admits a unique solution and condition (37) holds, then the system (38) admits a
unique solution, and equivalently, the CC system (33) admits a unique solution.
Proof. Let Y˜ = KX˜ + κ. By Itoˆ formula, we have
(A˜2X˜ + B˜2(KX˜ + κ) + C˜2Z˜ +
˜¯C2EZ˜ + f˜)dt+ Z˜dB(t) = dY˜
=dK × X˜ +K × dX˜ + dκ
=dK × X˜ + (KA˜1X˜ +KB˜1KX˜ +KB˜1κ)dt+ (KA˜′1X˜ +KB˜′1KX˜ +KB˜′1κ)dB(t) + dκ.
Comparing the diffusion term, one can obtain
Z˜ = KA˜′1X˜ +KB˜
′
1KX˜ +KB˜
′
1κ,
which implies
˜¯C2EZ˜ =
˜¯C2KA˜
′
1EX˜ +
˜¯C2KB˜
′
1KEX˜ +
˜¯C2KB˜
′
1κ.
Comparing the drift term and taking expectation, we obtain
A˜2EX˜ + B˜2KEX˜ + B˜2κ+ (C˜2 +
˜¯C2)KA˜
′
1EX˜ + (C˜2 +
˜¯C2)KB˜
′
1KEX˜ + (C˜2 +
˜¯C2)KB˜
′
1κ+ f˜
=K˙EX˜ +KA˜1EX˜ +KB˜1KEX˜ +KB˜1κ+ κ˙.
(40)
By comparing the coefficients of (40), K should be the solution of (39) and κ
satisfies
− κ˙+ [B˜2 + (C˜2 + ˜¯C2)KB˜′1 −KB˜1]κ+ f˜ = 0, κ(T ) = g˜. (41)
Under (A1)-(A2), by [29], equation (41) always admits a unique solution. Thus,
if the Riccati equation (39) admits a unique solution, then the system (38) also
admits a unique solution. Correspondingly, the CC system (33) admits a unique
solution as well.
The Riccati equation (39) can be rewritten as follows
K˙ = A˜2 + B˜2K −K(A˜1 + B˜1K) + (C˜2 + ˜¯C2)K(A˜′1 + B˜′1K), K(T ) = G˜, (42)
which is not a general symmetric Riccati equation. Thus, it is not always solv-
able on [0, T ]. However, explicit solutions can still be obtained in some reduced
but nontrivial cases. For example, by [35, Theorem 5.3], we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.5. If we let C˜2 +
˜¯C2 = 0 (i.e., C = F˜ = 0) and the following
condition hold: [
(0, I)Ψ(T, t)
(
0
I
)]−1
∈ L1(0, T ;Rn×n), (43)
then the Riccati equation (42) admit a unique solution K which is given by the
following:
K = −
[
(0, I)Ψ(T, t)
(
0
I
)]−1
(0, I)Ψ(T, t)
(
I
0
)
, t ∈ [0, T ],
where Ψ(t, s) is the fundamental matrix w.r.t.
(
A˜1 B˜1
A˜2 B˜2
)
.
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Through the discussion above, we have studied the solvability of the CC system.
Besides the Riccati equation method, the solvability of a FBSDE can still be studied
through many other techniques, like four-step scheme (see [37]) monotone condition
(see [26]) and contraction mapping method (see [25]). However, it is not the main
topic in this paper, and we would not make more discussion in detail. In what
follows, for the sake of discussion simplicity, we introduce the following assumption
directly.
4. (A4) The CC system (33) admit a unique solution (xˇ, yˇ1, yˇ2, βˇ1).
By Lemma 5.1, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.6. Under (A1)-(A4), Problem 2 admits a feedback form mean-field
decentralized control u˜i = Θ1x˜i +Θ2, where
Θ1 , −(R+DTPD)−1(BTP +DTPC), Θ2 , −(R+DTPD)−1(BTϕ+DTPF˜ xˆ),
and P , ϕ are the solution of
P˙ + PA+ATP + CTPC +Q− (PB + CTPD)(R+DTPD)−1(BTP +DTPC) = 0,
ϕ˙+ [AT − (PB + CTPD)(R +DTPD)−1BT ]ϕ
− [(PB + CTPD)(R +DTPD)−1DT − CT ]PF˜ xˆ+ PF xˆ
−Q(Γxˆ+ η)− ΓTQ[(I − Γ)xˆ− η] + (FT yˆ2 + FT yˆ1 + F˜T βˆ1) = 0,
P (T ) = G, ϕ(T ) = −G(Γ¯xˆ(T ) + η¯)− Γ¯TG[(I − Γ¯)xˆ(T )− η¯].
Mean-field terms xˆ, yˆ2, yˆ1, βˆ1 are determined by xˆ = Exˇ, yˆ2 = yˇ2, yˆ1 = Eyˇ1,
βˆ1 = Eβˇ1 and (xˇ, yˇ2, yˇ1, βˇ1) is the solution of CC system (33). x˜i is realized state
satisfying{
dx˜i = (Ax˜i+B(Θ1x˜i+Θ2)+F x˜
(N))dt+(Cx˜i+D(Θ1x˜i+Θ2)+F˜ x˜
(N))dWi,
x˜i(0) = ξ0,
(44)
where x˜(N) , 1
N
∑N
i=1 x˜i.
Through the discussion above, the mean-field decentralized control has been
characterized in Theorem 5.6. In what follows, the performance of this mean-field
decentralized control will be studied. Specifically, the asymptotic optimality will be
proved.
6. Asymptotic social optimality. In this section, we will prove that the mean-
field decentralized control given by Theorem 5.6 is asymptotically optimal. We
introduce a new generic approach, which is different from traditional mean-field
games scheme (e.g., [4], [11], [14]), where the authors usually use the auxiliary cost
functional as a bridge to obtain the asymptotic optimality. Also, our method is
different from some reduced social optima models (e.g., [16], [30], [31]), where the
optimality loss can be calculated directly with completing square method. Specifi-
cally, we estimate the social optimality loss by studying the Fre´chet differential of
the social cost functional.
Firstly, we distinguish the realized state and the optimal state of auxiliary prob-
lem. Let u˜ , (u˜1, · · · , u˜N) be the mean-field decentralized control given by Theorem
5.6, where u˜i = Θ1x˜i +Θ2. The realized decentralized state x˜i satisfies (44) which
depends on the state-average x˜(N), while the optimal auxiliary state α¯i satisfies
(30) which depends on the mean-field term xˆ, and the optimal auxiliary control is
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v¯i = Θ1α¯i+Θ2. Correspondingly, the social cost functional Ji w.r.t the mean-field
decentralized control u˜ is
Ji(u˜i, u˜−i) = 1
2
E
{∫ T
0
‖x˜i − Γx˜(N) − η‖2Q + ‖u˜i‖2Rdt+ ‖x˜i(T )− Γ¯x˜(N)(T )− η¯‖2G
}
,
and the auxiliary cost functional Ji w.r.t the optimal auxiliary control v¯i is
Ji(v¯i) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
‖α¯i − Γxˆ− η‖2Q + ‖v¯i‖2Rdt+ ‖α¯i(T )− Γ¯xˆ(T )− η¯‖2G
}
.
Next, we present the definition of asymptotic optimality.
Definition 6.1. A decentralized control uε , (uε1, · · · , uεN ) ∈ U1 × · · · × UN has
asymptotic social optimality if
1
N
∣∣∣ inf
u∈Uc
J (N)soc (u)− J (N)soc (uε)
∣∣∣ = ε(N), ε(N)→ 0, when N →∞,
where Uc is defined in Section 2 as a set of centralized information-based control.
6.1. Preliminary estimations. To study the asymptotic optimality, we first pro-
vide several prior lemmas which will play a significant role in future analysis. In
the discussion below, for sake of notation simplicity, we will use L to denote a
generic constant whose value may change from line to line and only depend on the
coefficients (i.e., A, B, C, D, F , F˜ , Γ, η, Q, R, ξ0).
Lemma 6.2. Under (A1)-(A4), there exists some constant L such that
sup
1≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
‖x˜i(t)‖2 ≤ L, sup
0≤t≤T
E‖x˜(N)(t)‖2 ≤ L, E
∫ T
0
‖u˜i‖2dt ≤ L,
where u˜i = Θ1x˜i +Θ2.
Proof. By referring [11, Section 5], we have the first and the second inequality.
Based on the boundness of x˜i and ϕ, the third inequality could be obtained easily.
The detailed proof is omitted here.
Next, the estimation of the difference between the mean-field term xˆ and the
realized state-average x˜(N) is as follows.
Lemma 6.3. Under (A1)-(A4), It follows that
E sup
0≤t≤T
‖x˜(N) − xˆ‖2 = O
(
1
N
)
. (45)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Based on Lemma 6.3 we have the following estimation.
Lemma 6.4. Under (A1)-(A4), for some constant L such that
sup
1≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
‖x˜i − α¯i‖2 < L, sup
1≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
‖x˜i − xˆ‖2 < L.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Moreover, based on Lemma 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, we have the following estimation of the
social cost functional.
Lemma 6.5. Under (A1)-(A4), for some constant L such that
J (N)soc (u˜1, · · · , u˜N ) ≤ NL.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Since we are studying the asymptotic optimality of u˜, it is sufficient only to con-
sider those admissible control perform better then u˜. Specifically, we only consider
those admissible controls u´ satisfying
J (N)soc (u´) ≤ J Nsoc(u˜) ≤ NL. (46)
For these admissible controls satisfying (46), we have the following estimation.
Proposition 6.6. Under (A1)-(A4), for any admissible control u´ ∈ Uc satisfying
(46), there exists a constant L such that
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
‖u´i‖2dt ≤ NL.
Proof. By (46), this result can be obtained forthrightly.
Next, we introduce a last lemma for single agent perturbation. Consider an
admissible control (u˜1, · · · , u˜i−1, u´i, u˜i+1, · · · , u˜N ) ∈ Uc. Note that here all the
agents apply the mean-field decentralized control law given by Theorem 5.6 except
Ai. Correspondingly the agent state is denoted by (x´1, · · · , x´N ). We denote δui ,
u´i− u˜i and correspondingly δxj , x´j − x˜j , x´(N) , 1N
∑N
j=1 x´j , δx
(N) , x´(N)− x˜(N)
for j = 1, · · · , N . Similarly, δαi , α´i − α¯i, where α¯i is the optimal auxiliary state
(30) and α´i is the δui-perturbed auxiliary state satisfying
dα´i = (Aα´i +Bv´i + F xˆ)dt+ (Cα´i +Dv´i + F˜ xˆ)dWi, α´i(0) = ξ0.
The δui-perturbed auxiliary control v´i = Θ1α¯i +Θ2 + δui.
Lemma 6.7. Under (A1)-(A4), for some constant L and any admissible control
with form (u˜1, · · · , u˜i−1, u´i, u˜i+1, · · · , u˜N) ∈ Uc satisfying E
∫ T
0
‖u´i‖2dt < L, it
follows that
E sup
0≤t≤T
‖δxi − δai‖2 = O
( 1
N2
)
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
6.2. Asymptotic optimality. Next, we begin to estimate the optimality loss.
Recalling Section 3, the large-population system can be rewritten as follows
minimize: J (N)soc (u) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
xTQx+ 2ST1 x+Nη
TQη + uTRudt
+ x(T )TGx(T ) + 2ST2 x(T ) +Nη¯
TGη¯
}
,
subject to: dx = (Ax+Bu)dt+
N∑
i=1
(Cix+Diu)dWi, x(0) = Ξ,
(47)
where x, u, Q, S1, S2, R, G, A, B, C, D, Ξ follow (6) and (7). For any given
admissible u, the state x can be determined by
x(t) =Φ(t)Ξ + Φ(t)
∫ t
0
Φ(s)−1
[
(B−
N∑
i=1
CiDi)u(s)
]
ds+
N∑
i=1
Φ(t)
∫ t
0
Φ(s)−1DiudWi(s),
(48)
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where
dΦ(t) = AΦ(t)dt+
m∑
i=1
CiΦ(t)dWi, Φ(0) = I.
Define the following operators
(Lu(·))(·) , Φ(·)
{∫ ·
0
Φ(s)−1
[
(B−
N∑
i=1
CiDi)u(s)
]
ds+
N∑
i=1
∫ ·
0
Φ(s)−1DiudWi(s)
}
,
L˜u(·) = (Lu(·))(T ), ΓΞ(·) = Φ(·)Φ−1(0)Ξ, Γ˜Ξ = (ΓΞ)(T ).
Correspondingly, L∗ is defined as the adjoint operator of L (see [37]). Given any
admissible u, x can be represented as follows
x(·) = (Lu(·))(·) + ΓΞ(·), x(T ) = L˜u(·) + Γ˜Ξ,
and the cost functional can be rewritten as
2J (N)soc (u) =E
{∫ T
0
xTQx+ 2ST1 x+Nη
TQη + uTRudt+ x(T )TGx(T )
+ 2ST2 x(T ) +Nη¯
TGη¯
}
, 〈M2u(·),u(·)〉 + 2〈M1,u(·)〉+M0.
(49)
where{
M2 , L
∗QL+ L˜∗GL˜+R, M1 , L∗(QΓΞ(·) + S1) + L˜∗(GΓ˜Ξ(·) + S2),
M0 , 〈QΓΞ(·),ΓΞ(·)〉 + 2〈S1,ΓΞ(·)〉+ 2〈S2, Γ˜Ξ(·)〉 + TNηTQη +Nη¯TGη¯.
Note that, M2 is a bounded self-adjoint linear operator. Let u˜ = [u˜
T
1 , · · · , u˜Tn ]T
be the decentralized control given by Theorem 5.6. Consider a perturbation: u =
u˜+ δu. Then
2J (N)soc (u˜+ δu) = 〈M2(u˜+ δu), u˜+ δu〉+ 2〈M1, u˜+ δu〉+M0
= 2J (N)soc (u˜) + 2〈M2u˜+M1, δu〉+ o(δu).
(50)
Here, 〈M2u˜ +M1, ·〉 is the Fre´chet differential of J (N)soc on u˜. By the linearity, we
also have
J (N)soc (u˜+ δu) = J (N)soc (u˜) +
N∑
i=1
〈M2u˜+M1, δui〉+ o(δu), (51)
where δui , (0
T , · · · , 0T , δuTi , 0T , · · · , 0T )T . Specifically,
J (N)soc (u˜+ δui) = J (N)soc (u˜) + 〈M2u˜+M1, δui〉+ o(δui). (52)
For the estimation of M2u˜+M1, we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 6.8. Under (A1)-(A4), for the mean-field decentralized control (u˜1, · · · ,
u˜N) given by Theorem 5.6, we have
‖M2u˜+M1‖ = O
( 1√
N
)
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Based on the discussion above, we can introduce the result of the asymptotic
optimality.
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Theorem 6.9. Under (A1)-(A4), the mean-field decentralized control u˜ given by
Theorem 5.6 has asymptotic social optimality such that
1
N
∣∣∣ inf
u∈Uc
J (N)soc (u)− J (N)soc (u˜)
∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
.
Proof. By the representation of (47), J (N)soc (u˜) − J (N)soc (u˜ + δu) = o(N) is aimed
to prove, for any admissible control u˜+ δu satisfying condition (46). By (50), the
following relation can be obtained
0 ≤J (N)soc (u˜)− J (N)soc (u˜+ δu) = −
(
N∑
i=1
〈M2u˜+M1, δui〉
)
− 1
2
〈M2δu, δu〉
≤
√√√√ N∑
i=1
‖M2u˜+M1‖2
N∑
i=1
‖δui‖2 − 1
2
〈M2δu, δu〉
=
√
N‖M2u˜+M1‖2 ×O(
√
N)− 1
2
〈M2δu, δu〉.
(53)
Thus, by Lemma 6.8 and noting the convexity (i.e., 12 〈M2δu, δu〉 ≥ 0), we have
J (N)soc (u˜)− J (N)soc (u˜+ δu) =O
(√
N
)
.
Theorem 6.9 follows.
7. A numerical example. Next, we will show an example by letting n = m = 2,
A = ( 0.9723 0.97070.7409 0.0118 ), B = (
0.7310 0.7980
0.2814 0.6108 ), F = (
0.2077 0.4383
0.5265 0.2515 ), C = (
0.5469 0.9669
0.3363 0.8207 ), D =
( 0.9051 0.85510.8856 0.4914 ), F˜ = (
0.4969 0.5103
0.4094 0.2017 ), ξ0 = (
0.1627
0.6570 ), Γ = (
0.7420 0.9669
0.2016 0.1553 ), η = (
0.8740
0.7733 ),
Q = ( 0.1845 00 0.1785 ) and R = (
0.6587 0
0 0.8763 ). Time interval T = 1 and the population
N = 1000.
Firstly, by applying Runge-Kutta methods to (39) and (41), we can obtainK and
κ respectively. Then using the relation Y˜ = KX˜+ κ and Z˜ = KA˜′1X˜ +KB˜
′
1KX˜ +
KB˜′1κ, (38) can be solved and we can determine X˜, Y˜ , Z˜. Correspondingly, xˆ, yˆ1,
βˆ1 can also be obtained. By calculating (27), (28) and (29), we have P , ϕ, Θ1, Θ2,
and then the realized state x˜i would follows by (44).
Through the calculation above, we can obtain the two coordinates of the trajec-
tories of realized state-average x˜(N) and mean-field term xˆ as follows.
8. Conclusion. In this paper, we investigate the social optimum of a generalized
form of mean-field LQG control problem. First, we discuss the convexity of the
social cost functional and summarize some conditions for some cases of indefinite
weight coefficients. Then based on person by person optimality and duality pro-
cedures, a set of decentralized controls is designed by solving an auxiliary control
problem which subject to a MF-FBSDEs system (CC system) in mean-field approx-
imations. We study the well-posedness of the MF-FBSDEs system and obtain the
conditions for its solvability. Finally, the corresponding decentralized controls is
proved to has asymptotic social optimality.
Appendix A. Proofs of some preliminary estimations.
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Proof of Lemma 6.3. By (32), (33) and (44), the dynamic of x˜(N) − xˆ follows
d(x˜(N) − xˆ) = (Π1 + F )(x˜(N) − xˆ)dt+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
[(C +DΘ1 + F˜ )x˜i +DΘ2]dWi,
(x˜(N) − xˆ)(0) = 0.
By applying Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, Burkholder-Davis-Gundy’s inequality and
Lemma 6.2, there exist some constants L such that
E sup
0≤s≤t
‖x˜(N)(s)− xˆ(s)‖2
≤2E sup
0≤s≤t
∥∥∥∥∫ s
0
(Π1 + F )(x˜
(N) − xˆ)dr
∥∥∥∥2 + 2N2E sup0≤s≤t
∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
i=1
∫ s
0
[(C +DΘ1 + F˜ )x˜i +DΘ2]dWi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤2E
∫ t
0
∥∥∥(Π1 + F )(x˜(N) − xˆ)∥∥∥2 dr + L
N2
E
N∑
i=1
∫ t
0
∥∥∥(C +DΘ1 + F˜ )x˜i +DΘ2∥∥∥2 dr
=LE
∫ t
0
∥∥∥x˜(N) − xˆ∥∥∥2 dr +O( 1
N
)
.
Then, by Gronwall’s inequality,
E sup
0≤t≤T
‖x˜(N)(t)− xˆ(t)‖2 = O
(
1
N
)
.
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Proof of Lemma 6.4. By (44) and (33), we have
d(x˜i − xˆ) =
{[
A−B(R +DTPD)−1(BTP +DTPC)](x˜i − xˆ) + F (x˜(N) − xˆ)}dt
+
[
(C +DΘ1)x˜i +DΘ2 + F˜ x˜
(N)
]
dWi,
x˜i(0)− xˆ(0) = 0.
By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, Burkholder-Davis-Gundy’s inequality and Lemma
6.3, there exist some constants L such that
E sup
0≤s≤t
‖x˜i(s)− xˆ(s)‖2
≤4E sup
0≤s≤t
∫ s
0
∥∥∥[A−B(R+DTPD)−1(BTP +DTPC)](x˜i − xˆ)∥∥∥2 + ‖F (x˜(N) − xˆ)‖2dr
+ 2E sup
0≤s≤t
∥∥∥∥∥
∫ s
0
[
(C +DΘ1)x˜i +DΘ2 + F˜ x˜
(N)
]
dWi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤L
{
E
∫ t
0
‖x˜i − xˆ‖2dr +O
(
1
N
)
+ E
∫ t
0
∥∥∥(C +DΘ1)x˜i +DΘ2 + F˜ x˜(N)∥∥∥2dr
}
≤L
{
E
∫ t
0
‖x˜i − xˆ‖2dr +O
(
1
N
)
+ L
}
.
Then, by Gronwall’s inequality, one can obtain
E sup
0≤t≤T
‖x˜i(t)− xˆ(t)‖2 ≤ L,
where L is not related to i and the lemma follows. Similarly, by (30) and (44), The
dynamic of x˜i − α¯i follows
d(x˜i − α¯i) = [(A+BΘ1)(x˜i − α¯i) + F (x˜(N) − xˆ)]dt
+ [(C +DΘ1)(x˜i − α¯i) + F˜ (x˜(N) − xˆ)]dWi,
(x˜i − α¯i)(0) = 0.
(54)
Applying Burkholder-Davis-Gundy’s inequality, Gronwall’s inequality, and Lemma
6.3, the result can be obtained.
Proof of Lemma 6.5. By (2) and Lemma 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, for some constants L we have
2J (N)soc (u˜1, · · · ,u˜N ) =
N∑
i=1
E
{∫ T
0
‖x˜i − Γxˆ+ Γxˆ− Γx˜(N) − η‖2Q + ‖u˜i‖2R dt
+ ‖x˜i(T )− Γ¯xˆ(T ) + Γ¯xˆ(T )− Γ¯x˜(N)(T )− η¯‖2G
}
≤L
N∑
i=1
E
{∫ T
0
‖x˜i − xˆ‖2 + ‖xˆ− x˜(N)‖2 + ‖η‖2 + ‖u˜i‖2dt
+ ‖x˜i(T )− xˆ(T )‖2 + ‖xˆ(T )− x˜(N)(T )‖2 + ‖η¯‖2
}
≤L
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
L+O
( 1
N
)
dt ≤ NL.
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To prove Lemma 6.7, we need the following lemmas.
Lemma A.1. Under (A1)-(A4), for some constant L and any admissible control
with form (u˜1, · · · , u˜i−1, u´i, u˜i+1, · · · , u˜N) ∈ Uc satisfying E
∫ T
0
‖u´i‖2dt < L, it
follows that
E sup
0≤t≤T
‖δx(N)‖2 = O
( 1
N2
)
.
Proof of Lemma A.1. The dynamic of δx(N) follows
dδx(N) =
[
(A+ F )δx(N) +
B
N
δui
]
dt+
1
N
N∑
j=1
(Cδxj + F˜ δx
(N))dWj +
1
N
DδuidWi,
δx(N)(0) = 0.
By Lemma 6.3, we have E sup0≤t≤T ‖x˜(N)(t) − xˆ(t)‖2 = O
(
1
N
)
. By Burkholder-
Davis-Gundy’s inequality and the boundness of u´i, there exist some constants L
such that
E sup
0≤s≤t
‖δx(N)(s)‖2 = E sup
0≤s≤t
∥∥∥∥∥
∫ s
0
[
(A+ F )δx(N) +
B
N
δui
]
dr +
1
N
D
∫ s
0
δuidWi
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ s
0
(Cδxj + F˜ δx
(N))dWj
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤LE
∫ t
0
‖δx(N)‖2dr + L
N2
N∑
i=1
E
∫ t
0
‖δxi‖2 + ‖δx(N)‖2dr +O
( 1
N2
)
.
Applying Gronwall’s inequality, for some constant L, one can obtain
E sup
0≤s≤t
‖δxj(s)‖2 ≤LE
∫ t
0
‖δx(N)‖2ds+
∫ t
0
LE
∫ s
0
‖δx(N)‖2drds
≤LE
∫ t
0
‖δx(N)‖2ds, j 6= i.
Thus
E sup
0≤s≤t
‖δx(N)(s)‖2 ≤LE
∫ t
0
‖δx(N)‖2ds+O
( 1
N2
)
.
Again, by Gronwall’s inequality
E sup
0≤t≤T
‖δx(N)(t)‖2 = O
( 1
N2
)
.
Lemma A.2. Under (A1)-(A4), for some constant L and any admissible control
with form (u˜1, · · · , u˜i−1, u´i, u˜i+1, · · · , u˜N) ∈ Uc satisfying E
∫ T
0 ‖u´i‖2dt < L, it
follows that
sup
1≤j≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
‖δxj‖2 = O
( 1
N2
)
. (55)
Proof. By the proof of Lemma A.1, for some constant L, we have
E sup
0≤s≤t
‖δxj‖2 ≤ LE
∫ t
0
‖δx(N)‖2ds = O
( 1
N2
)
.
Note that L is independent of j and Proposition A.2 holds.
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Based on Lemma A.1, we can also obtain the following estimation of δxi − δai.
Proof of Lemma 6.7. The dynamics of δxi − δai follows{
d(δxi − δai) = [A(δxi − δai) + Fδx(N)]dt+ [C(δxi − δai) + F˜ δx(N)]dWi,
(δxi − δai)(0) = 0.
By Lemma A.1, we have E sup0≤t≤T ‖δx(N)(t)‖2 = O
(
1
N2
)
. Thus, applying Burkholder-
Davis-Gundy’s inequality and Gronwall’s inequality, the lemma follows.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 6.8.
Proof. Motivated by (52), we consider 〈M2u˜+M1, δui〉 for some single-agent bounded
perturbation δui satisfying E
∫ T
0
‖δui‖2dt < L for some constant L. By the calcu-
lation in Section 3, when we only perturb Ai, the variation of the cost functional
is
J (N)soc (u˜+ δui) = J (N)soc (u˜) + E
{∫ T
0
〈Q(x˜i − Γx˜(N) − η), δxi〉 − 〈ΓTQ(x˜i − Γx˜(N) − η), δx(N)〉
+
∑
j 6=i
〈Q(x˜j − Γx˜(N) − η), δxj〉 −
∑
j 6=i
〈ΓTQ(x˜j − Γx˜(N) − η), δx(N)〉+ 〈Ru˜i, δui〉dt+ 〈G(x˜i(T )
− Γ¯x˜(N)(T )− η¯), δxi(T )〉 − 〈Γ¯TG(x˜i(T )− Γ¯x˜(N)(T )− η¯), δx(N)(T )〉+
∑
j 6=i
〈G(x˜j(T )
− Γ¯x˜(N)(T )− η¯), δxj(T )〉 −
∑
j 6=i
〈Γ¯TG(x˜j(T )− Γ¯x˜(N)(T )− η¯), δx(N)(T )〉
}
+ o(δui).
Thus, for the Fre´chet derivative of Ai on u˜, we have
〈M2u˜+M1, δui〉 = E
{∫ T
0
〈Q(x˜i − Γx˜(N) − η), δxi〉 − 〈ΓTQ(x˜i − Γx˜(N) − η), δx(N)〉
+
∑
j 6=i
〈Q(x˜j − Γx˜(N) − η), δxj〉 −
∑
j 6=i
〈ΓTQ(x˜j − Γx˜(N) − η), δx(N)〉+ 〈Ru˜i, δui〉dt
+ 〈G(x˜i(T )− Γ¯x˜(N)(T )− η¯), δxi(T )〉 − 〈Γ¯TG(x˜i(T )− Γ¯x˜(N)(T )− η¯), δx(N)(T )〉
+
∑
j 6=i
〈G(x˜j(T )− Γ¯x˜(N)(T )− η¯), δxj(T )〉 −
∑
j 6=i
〈Γ¯TG(x˜j(T )− Γ¯x˜(N)(T )− η¯), δx(N)(T )〉
}
.
(56)
Next, we will verify ε1, · · · , ε6 = o(1), since
〈M2u˜+M1, δui〉 −
6∑
i=1
εi = δJi = 0. (57)
Equation (57) follows by (23), (56) and the optimality of the auxiliary cost func-
tional. Firstly, we consider ε1 which is given by (16). By Lemma 6.2, Lemma 6.3
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and A.1, for some constant L, we have
ε1 = E
{∫ T
0
〈(ΓTQΓ−QΓ)(x˜(N) − xˆ), Nδx(N)〉dt
+ 〈(Γ¯TQΓ¯−QΓ¯)(x¯(N)(T )− xˆ(T )), Nδx(N)(T )〉
}
≤ NL
√
E
∫ T
0
‖x˜(N) − xˆ‖2dtE
∫ T
0
‖δx(N)‖2dt+O
( 1√
N
)
= O
( 1√
N
)
,
ε2 = E
{∫ T
0
−〈ΓTQ(x¯i − Γx¯(N) − η), δx(N)〉dt− 〈Γ¯TG(x¯i(T )− Γ¯xˆ(T )− η¯), δx(N)(T )〉
}
= 2L×O
( 1
N2
)
= O
( 1
N2
)
.
(58)
Next, we will estimate ε3 which is given by (19). We consider δx
(−i) − x∗∗ first,
where
d(δx(−i) − x∗∗) =
[
(A+ F )(δx(−i) − x∗∗)− F
N
δx(N)
]
dt+
∑
j 6=i
[
Cδxj +
F˜
N
(δx(−i) + δxi)
]
dWj ,
δx(−i)(0)− x∗∗(0) = 0.
By Lemma 6.3 and Corollary A.2, for some constant L such that
E sup
0≤s≤t
‖δx(−i)(s)− x∗∗(s)‖2
≤LE
∫ t
0
[
‖δx(−i) − x∗∗‖2 + K
N2
‖δx(N)‖2
]
ds+ E sup
0≤s≤t
∥∥∥∥∑
j 6=i
∫ t
0
[Cδxj +
F˜
N
(δx(−i) + δxi)]dWj
∥∥∥∥2
≤LE
∫ t
0
‖δx(−i) − x∗∗‖2ds+O
( 1
N4
)
+ LE
∑
j 6=i
∫ t
0
‖δxj‖2 + ‖δx(N)‖2ds
=LE
∫ t
0
‖δx(−i) − x∗∗‖2ds+O
( 1
N4
)
+O
( 1
N
)
+O
( 1
N
)
.
Thus,
E sup
0≤t≤T
‖δx(−i)(t)− x∗∗(t)‖2 = O
( 1
N
)
.
Similarly, the dynamics of Nδxj − x∗j is given by d(Nδxj − x
∗
j ) =
[
A(Nδxj − x∗j ) + F (δx(−i) − x∗∗)
]
dt+
[
C(Nδxj − x∗j ) + F˜ (δx(−i) − x∗∗)
]
dWj ,
Nδxj(0)− x∗j (0) = 0.
For some constant L, one can obtain
E sup
0≤s≤t
‖Nδxj − x∗j‖2 =LE
∫ t
0
‖Nδxj − x∗j‖2 + ‖δx(−i) − x∗∗‖2ds
=LE
∫ t
0
‖Nδxj − x∗j‖2ds+O
( 1
N2
)
.
Hence, by Gronwall’s inequality,
E sup
0≤t≤T
‖Nδxj − x∗j‖2 = O
( 1
N2
)
.
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For ε3, there exist some constants L such that
ε3 =E
∫ T
0
1
N
∑
j 6=i
〈Q(x˜j − Γxˆ− η), Nδxj − x∗j 〉 −
1
N
∑
j 6=i
〈ΓTQ(x˜j − Γxˆ− η), δx(−i)
− x∗∗〉dt+ 1
N
∑
j 6=i
〈G(x¯j(T )− Γ¯xˆ(T )− η¯), Nδxj(T )− x∗j (T )〉 −
1
N
∑
j 6=i
〈Γ¯TG(x¯j(T )
− Γ¯xˆ(T )− η¯), δx(−i)(T )− x∗∗(T )〉
≤ 1
N
∑
j 6=i
√
E
∫ T
0
‖Q(x˜j − Γxˆ− η)‖2dtE
∫ T
0
‖Nδxj − x∗j‖2dt
+
1
N
∑
j 6=i
√
E
∫ T
0
‖ΓTQ(x˜j − Γxˆ− η)‖2dtE
∫ T
0
‖δx(−i) − x∗∗‖2dt+O
( 1√
N
)
=
1
N
∑
j 6=i
√
L×O
( 1
N2
)
+
√
L× O
( 1
N
)
= O
( 1√
N
)
.
In what follows, we aim prove that ε4 = o(1). By Lemma 6.3 and A.1 we have
ε4 =E
∫ T
0
−
〈
ΓTQ
(∑
j 6=i x˜j
N
− xˆ
)
,
N∑
i=1
δxi
〉
dt−
〈
Γ¯TG
(∑
j 6=i x¯j(T )
N
− xˆ(T )
)
,
N∑
i=1
δxi(T )
〉
=2×O
( 1√
N
)
×O
( 1
N
)
.
For ε5, which is given by (24), we need to estimate Eβ
j
1−
∑
N
j 6=i β
j
1
N
and Eyj1−
∑
N
j 6=i y
j
1
N
.
Recall that in Section 3, (20) can be rewritten as follows
dy1 = [−Q¯x˜+ q− A¯Ty1 +
N∑
j=1
C¯Tj z
j
1]dt+
N∑
j=1
zj1dWj , y1(T ) = Gx˜+ g,
dx˜ = (Ax˜+ b)dt+
N∑
i=1
(Cix˜+ hi)dWi, x˜(0) = Ξ,
where
A¯ =

A 0 · · · 0
0 A · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · A
 , C¯j =
1
...
jth
...
N

0 · · · 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 · · · C · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 · · · 0
 , G¯ =

G 0 · · · 0
0 G · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · G
 , Q¯ =

Q 0 · · · 0
0 Q · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · Q
 ,
A =

A+ F
N
+BΘ1
F
N
· · · F
N
F
N
A+ F
N
+ BΘ1 · · · FN
...
...
. . .
...
F
N
F
N
· · · A+ F
N
+BΘ1
 , b =
 BΘ2...
BΘ2
 , Ξ =
 ξ0...
ξ0
 , y1 =
 y
1
1
...
yN1
 , x˜ =
 x˜1...
x˜N
 ,
Ci =
1
...
ith
...
N

0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
F˜
N
· · · F˜
N
F˜
N
+ C +DΘ1
F˜
N
· · · F˜
N
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0
 , hi =
1
...
ith
...
N

0
...
DΘ2
...
0
 , g =
 GΓ¯xˆ+Gη¯...
GΓ¯xˆ+Gη¯
 , q =
 QΓxˆ+Qη...
QΓxˆ+Qη
 , zj1 =
 β
1j
1
...
β
Nj
1
 .
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Let y1 = Λx˜+ λ and the following equations can be derived
zj1 = ΛCj x˜+Λhj,
Λ˙+ΛA+ Q¯+ A¯TΛ−
N∑
j=1
C¯Tj ΛCj = 0, Λ(T ) =G,
λ˙+ A¯Tλ− q−
N∑
j=1
C¯Tj Λhj +Λb = 0, λ(T ) = g,
(59)
where Λ =
(
Λ11 ··· Λ1N
...
. . .
...
ΛN1 ··· ΛNN
)
. Thus, Eyj1 −
∑
N
j=1 y
j
1
N
= 1
N
(I, · · · , I)Λ
(
x˜1−Ex˜1
...
x˜N−Ex˜N
)
.
Clearly, if there exist some constants L such that sup
1≤i≤N
sup
0≤t≤T
‖
N∑
k=1
Λki(t)‖max < L
holds, then by letting E =
(
1 ··· 1
...
. . .
...
1 ··· 1
)
we have
∥∥∥Eyj1 −
∑N
j=1 y
j
1
N
∥∥∥2 = ∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
( N∑
k=1
Λki
)
(x˜i − Ex˜i)
∥∥∥∥2 ≤ L∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
E(x˜i − Ex˜i)
∥∥∥∥2
=L
∥∥∥∥E(x˜(N) − xˆ)∥∥∥∥2 = O( 1N ).
Thus, next step is to investigate Λ.
We can verify that Λii = Λ1 for i = 1, · · · , N and Λij = Λ2 for i 6= j, where Λ1
and Λ2 satisfy
Λ˙1+Λ1(A+BΘ1)+
(N−1)Λ2+Λ1
N
F+Q+ATΛ1− 1
N
CTΛ1F˜−CTΛ1(C+DΘ1)=0,
Λ˙2+Λ2(A+BΘ1)+
(N−1)Λ2+Λ1
N
F+ATΛ2− 1
N
CTΛ1F˜ = 0,
Λ1(T ) = G, Λ2(T ) = 0,
is a solution of Λ,
Hence,
∑N
k=1 Λki = Λ1 + (N − 1)Λ2 and we study the uniform boundness of Λ1
and Λ∗2 , (N − 1)Λ2 w.r.t N and t, where
Λ˙1 + Λ1
(
A+BΘ1 +
F
N
)
+ATΛ1 − CTΛ1(C +DΘ1 + F˜
N
) +
Λ∗2
N
F +Q = 0,
Λ˙∗2 + Λ
∗
2
(
A+BΘ1 +
N − 1
N
F
)
+ATΛ∗2 +
N − 1
N
(Λ1F − CTΛ1F˜ ) = 0,
Λ1(T ) = G, Λ
∗
2(T ) = 0.
(60)
Firstly, by the linearity, for any given N , Λ1 and Λ
∗
2 are solvable on [0, T ]. Let L
= sup0≤t≤T {‖A(t)‖max, ‖B(t)Θ1(t)‖max, ‖F (t)‖max, ‖C(t)‖max, ‖D(t)Θ1(t)‖max,
‖F˜ (t)‖max, ‖Q(t)‖max}. Introduce Λ¯1 and Λ¯∗2 satisfying
˙¯Λ1 + 3LΛ¯1E + LEΛ¯1 + 3LEΛ¯1E + LEΛ¯
∗
2 + LE = 0, Λ¯1(T ) = G,
˙¯Λ∗2 + 2LΛ¯
∗
2E + LEΛ¯
∗
2 + L(Λ¯1E + EΛ¯1E) = 0, Λ¯
∗
2(T ) = 0.
(61)
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By the linearity, Λ¯1 and Λ¯
∗
2 are solvable on [0, T ] and surely, bounded. For any
N and t ∈ [0, T ], |Λ1(t)| ≤ Λ¯1(t) and |Λ∗2(t)| ≤ Λ¯∗2(t). Thus, there exist some
constants L such that sup
1≤i≤N
sup
0≤t≤T
‖
N∑
k=1
Λki(t)‖max < L holds and it follows that
‖Eyj1 −
∑N
j=1 y
j
1
N
‖2 = o(1). Similarly, ‖Eβj1 −
∑N
j 6=i β
j
1
N
‖2 = o(1) and consequently
ε5 = o(1).
The estimation of ε6, which is given by (26), follows by Lemma 6.7 straightfor-
wardly and ε6 = O
(
1
N2
)
. Thus,
〈M2u˜+M1, δui〉 = δJi +
6∑
i=1
εi = O
( 1√
N
)
.
Using E
∫ T
0
‖δui‖2dt < L and the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, ‖M2u˜ + M1‖ =
O
(
1√
N
)
.
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